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Abstract 
 
A growing literature documents the existence of strategic political reactions to public 
expenditure between rival jurisdictions. These interactions can potentially create a downward 
expenditure spiral (‘race to the bottom’) or a rising expenditure spiral (‘race to the top’). 
However, in the course of identifying the existence of such interactions and ascertaining their 
underlying triggers, the empirical evidence has produced markedly heterogeneous findings. 
Most of this heterogeneity can be traced back to study design and institutional differences. 
This paper contributes to the literature by applying meta-regression analysis to quantify the 
magnitude of strategic inter-jurisdictional expenditure interactions, controlling for study and 
institutional characteristics. We find several robust results beyond confirming that 
jurisdictions do engage in strategic expenditure interactions, namely that strategic 
interactions: (i) are weakening over time, (ii) are stronger among municipalities than among 
higher levels of government, and (iii) appear to be more influenced from tax competition than 
yardstick competition, with capital controls and fiscal decentralization shaping the magnitude 
of fiscal interactions.  
 
Keywords: inter-jurisdictional competition; yardstick competition; meta-regression; 
expenditure competition 
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1. Introduction  
Governments often interact with each other. For example, if one government 
increases the supply of public schools, this is likely to impact on school supply decisions in 
neighboring jurisdictions. The political economy literature refers to such phenomena as 
‘strategic interactions’, denoting policies in one jurisdiction that are correlated with those 
from neighboring or benchmark jurisdictions. Interactions can take the form of competition 
or cooperation between rival jurisdictions in the provision of publicly provided goods and 
services (Volden, 2005). Moreover, interactions in public sector activity between 
jurisdictions can occur at the same level (e.g. municipalities horizontally competing with each 
other) or between different levels (e.g. States competing with Federal governments).  
Strategic interactions between rival jurisdictions are important because they shape 
public spending decisions (Berry, 2008; Besley and Rosen, 1998; Fiva and Rattso, 2006) and 
because they affect public policy adoption (Berry and Baybeck, 2005; Murillo and Martínez-
Gallardo, 2007). One of the most common consequences of such interactions within a 
democracy is the shaping of public expenditures to suit the median voter’s preferences in a 
given jurisdiction. Government strategic interactions are likely to be heterogeneous across 
countries depending upon the limits of fiscal capacity,
1
 the contours of the political agency 
control, the informal rules of political culture and the effectiveness of electoral institutions.  
To date it remains unclear what underpins such interactions and why some 
jurisdictions are more predisposed to interactions than others. The theoretical literature offers 
conflicting predictions regarding the existence and consequences of inter-government 
political interactions influencing public sector activity, and ultimately public expenditures. 
The direction of the reaction to a rival government’s expenditure policy is theoretically 
ambiguous (Eggert, 2001; Brueckner, 2003). Intervening variables such as the design of 
                                               
1
 By fiscal capacity we mean a class of factors such as the tax base, tax rates, the softness of the jurisdiction’s 
budget constraint, and the availability of debt financing. 
 3 
political incentives and institutional constraints are said to be important in shaping both the 
direction and magnitude of inter-government interactions (Oates, 1999; Besley, 2006; Rom, 
2006; Simeon, 2006). For example, classical examples of inter-governmental expenditure 
competition include the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ models which predict a downward bias 
in public expenditure resulting from inter-jurisdictional competition (Oates, 1972). In these 
models, rival jurisdictions are assumed to exhibit strong political and fiscal incentives to 
compete for mobile factors. Taxes and subsidies are then used to attract high-income 
households, while also trying to discourage low-income households and welfare dependents.
2
 
In a simple model where no other variables are accounted for, such inter-jurisdictional 
competition is said to erode redistributive expenditure, especially the provision of important 
public or publically provided private goods. Consequently, public expenditure levels are said 
to be sub-optimal.  
In contrast, when yardstick competition models are used to describe fiscal 
competition, it is the mechanisms of political agency that occupy the center stage. Here the 
emergence of a ‘race to the bottom’ is far from obvious. In these models, mobility is not the 
mechanism that gives rise to interdependence. Instead, interactions take place by comparison 
of some salient dimensions of public sector activity which are political rewarded in electoral 
contests. Strategic interactions in public sector activity can arise from yardstick competition 
mechanisms when the fear of electoral punishment induces incumbent governments to 
compete with their rivals at the same (horizontal competition) or different (vertical 
competition) level (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Breton, 1996; Costa-Font and 
Rico, 2006). In such settings, median voter type models predict that when faced with re-
election, governments might be reluctant to lower salient dimensions of the quality of social 
services (e.g., hospital waiting times and school staff). The latter is especially the case if the 
                                               
2
 ‘Desirable’ factors contribute to regional growth and development and to revenues for the jurisdiction, while 
‘undesirable’ factors add to social welfare expenditures (Craw, 2010). 
 4 
median voter uses them more than proportionally, or if the views of the median voter are 
highly supportive of certain sources of expenditure such as health care (Costa-Font and Pons, 
2007) and education. The latter two examples of so-called ‘merit goods’ are important 
because they tend to explain the largest sources of expenditure growth in advanced 
economies. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) point out that the pressure on public expenditure 
to converge with rival jurisdictions is moderated by ‘domestic costs to reform’.  
Given the above considerations, it is theoretically unclear what the effects of inter-
government competition will be. Indeed, the political economy literature postulates and maps 
out a wide range of possibilities: jurisdictions can engage in increased spending designed to 
attract (e.g., through schooling and recreation); they can engage in reduced spending intended 
to repel (e.g., through welfare payments); and they can engage in free riding, enjoying 
spillovers from the spending of others (e.g., from security and crime prevention).
3
 Thus it is 
possible that interactions can: engender a race-to-the-bottom, say through welfare 
competition that results in too little spending on public inputs; engender a 'race-to-the-top' 
where competition for desirable factors results in too much spending on public inputs; or 
have no net effect on spending at all. The theoretical ambiguity increases when considering 
strategic interactions within multi-tiered governments, where competition occurs between the 
same levels of government, as well as between governments at different levels too (Besley 
and Rosen, 1998; Wilson, 1999).
4
  
Theoretical ambiguity is matched by scattered and inconclusive empirical evidence, 
especially with respect to the size of public expenditure interactions, as well as the 
institutional and economic determinants underpinning them. Berry (2008, p. 817) correctly 
                                               
3
 Moreover, they can conceivably engage in all processes simultaneously, in terms of different expenditure 
categories. 
4
 Ambiguity emerges also with regard to regulatory competition. For example, inter-jurisdictional competition 
can result in a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental regulations resulting in sub-optimal regulation that makes 
all states worse off, or it can lead to a ‘race to the top’ (Konisky, 2007). 
 5 
argues that: “… the evidence of wasteful tax competition is largely anecdotal; the field has 
produced no systematic evidence of a fiscal race to the bottom …”.  
In this paper we assess the conflicting evidence on inter-jurisdictional strategic 
interactions (sometimes known as welfare spending competition). When study findings 
exhibit conflicting conclusions there is no clear policy advice forthcoming, unless some 
technique is used to weigh the evidence. We apply the statistical tools of meta-regression 
analysis (MRA) to analyze the existing evidence base. An assessment of the empirical 
literature is presently missing. Such an assessment can be developed using MRA, which we 
use to analyze statistically several dimensions of the literature, some of which have not been 
explored in the primary literature.   
Our main contribution to the literature is to document that there is actually sufficient 
evidence from which to conclude that jurisdictions do play expenditure games and engage in 
strategic expenditure interactions. Whether expenditure interactions take place or not is 
decidedly relevant to the design of federal jurisdictions, as interactions provide an additional 
source of pressure for governments to improve their efficiency. We also show that it is 
possible to identify the causes (determinants) of inter-government competition: larger 
interactions appear to emerge from tax competition rather than yardstick competition, which 
is consistent with our previous meta-analysis which documents tax competition interactions 
at both the nation and municipality level (Costa-Font et al., 2014).  
Through MRA, we take stock of the existing evidence and address four sets of issues. 
First, we explore whether strategic interactions or competition between rival jurisdictions 
does indeed affect government behavior and shape expenditure levels. Second, we examine 
whether expenditure interactions are more likely to occur in homogenous communities (e.g. 
local authorities within states) than at higher levels of aggregation of the government unit 
(e.g. at the state or national level). We then extend our analysis to differences between 
 6 
countries. Third, we seek to identify the institutional and regulatory factors that shape 
between-country differences. Specifically, we investigate whether expenditure interactions 
arise from tax competition and/or yardstick competition. Both give raise to different 
mechanisms: a reaction to the threat of factor mobility or to the threat of electoral defeat of 
the jurisdictional incumbent (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Breton, 1996). Finally, 
we wish to explain the large degree of heterogeneity in reported results between studies. Why 
do studies report different results?  
MRA is particularly well suited to drawing inferences from a literature that reports 
diverse estimates and where there is heterogeneity in the institutional settings and 
econometric models adopted.
5
 Our innovation is to apply MRA to explore dimensions that 
were not considered by the primary studies. We take advantage of the between-study 
heterogeneity to provide further insights into inter-jurisdiction competition and to explore 
additional dimensions. We do this by collecting information on the degree of capital controls, 
voter turnout, and the degree of decentralization of the jurisdictions investigated by primary 
studies. That is, we assess the evidence base by drawing upon data from within the studies 
themselves (such as reported estimates of strategic interactions), as well as information that 
was not considered by the authors, such as the degree of political participation and regulation 
of capital mobility that applied at the time the samples were taken. This enables us to model 
both the heterogeneity within the primary studies themselves (through their chosen 
econometric model), plus the heterogeneity in the samples used by different studies that was 
not previously modeled by the studies.  
 
 
2. From Primary Analysis to Meta-Analysis  
                                               
5
  There have been numerous applications of MRA, including Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) on the growth 
effects of aid, Efendic, Pugh and Adnett (2011) on institutions and economic performance and Feld and 
Heckemeyer (2011) on FDI and taxation. 
 7 
The fiscal interactions literature has progressed through several waves of research. 
The earlier empirical literature focused on welfare migration caused by competition for 
mobile resources.
6
 The subsequent and much larger empirical literature has focused on 
neighborhood effects by directly estimating fiscal reaction functions. Some of these studies 
investigate tax competition, while others focus on expenditure competition. The literature 
then moved on to estimate reaction functions between jurisdictions at different levels (vertical 
interactions). Expenditure interactions are modeled as reaction functions of the ith 
jurisdiction’s expenditure choices ( itE ) in year t, depending on the choices of the jth 
neighboring  jurisdiction at time t, plus other variables that also explain the jurisdiction’s 
expenditure: 
ittiit
iv
vtvtjt
ij
jtit EEE   

βx210 ,          (1) 
where β,,, 210   are parameters to be estimated, jtE refers to the fiscal choices of the j 
neighboring jurisdiction at time t (horizontal expenditure competition), vtE refers to the fiscal 
choices of the v higher level governments at time t (vertical expenditure competition)
7
, jt  
and vt are the associated ‘spatial weights’ that account for the influence of rival jurisdictions, 
x is a vector of other variables that affect a jurisdiction’s expenditure, and i  and t  are 
region and time fixed effects, respectively.  
 In estimating Eq. (1) researchers need to make several choices. First, there is the 
choice of the expenditure to be modeled: total expenditure or a specific component, such as 
health or education. A second choice involves the appropriate weight to assign to rival 
jurisdictions. Most studies weigh geographical contiguity positively in the spatial weights 
                                               
6
 There have also been some important recent papers on this theme, e.g., Schaltegger, Somogyi and Sturm 
(2011). 
7
 Actually, in contrast to the tax competition literature, very few spending/welfare competition studies include 
the vertical competition term. 
 8 
matrix (ω), though studies attach different weights to geographical neighbors (e.g., Case 1993 
and Case, Rosen and Hines 1993), or use some alternative weighing scheme, such as cross 
state news media influences (Edmark, 2007) or migration patterns (Figlio, Kolpin and Reid, 
1999). The third choice variable is the most efficient estimator. The main concern with Eq. 
(1) is the simultaneity problem created by strategic interactions between competing 
governments. This is a type of “spatial lag” that can create an omitted variable bias under 
OLS estimation. Alternatives to OLS are the Maximum Likelihood estimator, IV, and spatial 
GMM (Saavedra, 2000; Edmark, 2007; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998 and 1999).   
Estimation of Eq. (1) generates estimates of strategic interactions ( ), 21  . Our meta-
analysis involves identifying studies that report such estimates and coding these estimates, as 
well as other characteristics of the studies. When suitably converted, these estimates can be 
made comparable between studies and then included in the MRA: they form the ‘meta-data’ 
for our meta-analysis. The MRA model involves regressing estimates of inter-jurisdictional 
expenditure interactions against a constant and a set of variables that can explain the 
heterogeneity in estimates, such as data, specification and estimation differences in research 
design: 
    ijjkkij vr  Z0         (j=1, 2, …L),              (2) 
 
where rij are comparable estimates of the ith inter-jurisdictional expenditure interactions from 
study j, i.e. the transformations of estimates of 1 for horizontal inter-governmental 
expenditure competition from Eq. (1), vij is the random error term, and Zjk are moderator 
variables used to explain the large within and between study heterogeneity routinely found in 
economics research (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). The logic of Eq. (2) is that reported estimates 
will vary as a result of sampling error and a set of variables used to reflect features of the data 
used and the way in which the studies were conducted (Roberts and Stanley, 2005; 
 9 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008). That is, estimates of interactions will vary because of 
genuine heterogeneity in strategic interactions and also because of heterogeneity in research 
design. In particular, Eq. (2) enables us to quantify the impact of misspecification and 
omitted variable biases in the primary literature.  
In this paper, estimation of the MRA model, Eq. (2), is carried out using unrestricted 
weighted least squares (WLS), with standard errors adjusted for data clustering. Eq. (2) uses 
multiple estimates per study. Multiple estimates reported within a single study might not be 
statistically independent of each other, violating one of the OLS assumptions. Hence, we 
adjust the standard errors for data clustering, using each study in our meta-dataset as a 
distinct cluster (estimates are assumed to be clustered within studies).
8
 Estimates of strategic 
interactions and their partial correlation transformations will have different variances 
(heteroscedasticity). This is evident from the funnel plot, Figure 1 discussed below. WLS 
corrects this heteroscedasticity. We use inverse variance as the weights, assigning larger 
weight to estimates with greater precision.  
 
3. The Meta-Data 
The data for the meta-regression analysis needs to satisfy three criteria: they should be 
comprehensive, comparable and representative. We followed the MAER-NET guidelines in 
constructing the database and conducting the MRA (see Stanley et al. 2013). 
 
3.1 Study selection  
We carried out a comprehensive search for all empirical studies that reported comparable 
estimates of inter-government expenditure competition. The search for studies involved 
numerous keywords and search engines, as well as checking all references cited within prior 
                                               
8
 Alternative approaches include the use of a linear hierarchical model or panel data techniques. We report such 
estimates as part of robustness tests. 
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studies. We searched both published material (books and journal papers), as well as the so-
called “Grey literature” (unpublished working papers, conference papers and dissertations). 
We searched for all studies published in either English or French. The search was terminated 
in December 2012. We excluded several studies that did not provide sufficient information 
from which we could calculate comparable effect sizes (in our case the partial correlations 
discussed below). This search process identified 33 studies of horizontal expenditure 
competition that report 369 estimates and 3 studies of vertical expenditure competition that 
report 20 estimates. Due to the small number of studies and estimates, we do not consider 
vertical expenditure competition in the rest of this paper.
9
 The studies included in our meta-
dataset cover only developed countries, predominantly the USA, Sweden, the UK, and 
Switzerland (see Table 1, column 1). 
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 This poses no problems for our MRA of horizontal expenditure competition, as the inclusion of vertical 
expenditure competition in the primary econometric study does not to appear to make any noteworthy difference 
on the estimates of horizontal expenditure competition. 
 11 
 
As noted above, primary studies estimate some version of Eq. (1). In doing so, they 
differ in the way in which the dependent and explanatory variables are measured. Moreover, 
there are often differences in the scale of measurement used. Hence, the regression 
coefficients from Eq. (1) are not directly comparable across all studies (and estimates) 
included in the dataset. Following Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008), we converted the 
study results into partial correlations. Our focus in this paper is purely on the direct effect of 
the neighboring governments’ choice variable. Hence, we abstract from the various spatial 
impacts (LeSage and Fischer, 2008).
10
 
The partial correlations measure the degree of correlation between expenditures made 
by rival jurisdictions, controlling for the effects of variables that are unrelated to strategic 
interactions. Partial correlations are interpreted in the same manner as simple correlations. 
They are a unit-less measure of the strength and direction of jurisdictional interaction: the 
larger the partial correlation, the stronger the strategic interaction. While the partial 
correlation is a correlation, the underlying econometric models it is derived from are deemed 
to be causal models by their authors. Hence, to the extent that estimates of inter-jurisdictional 
competition are causal (they measure the effect of the spending decisions of other 
jurisdictions), then the partial correlations can also be interpreted as a causal measure. A 
more conservative approach is to treat them as correlations without any causal inference. 
While there are 369 reported estimates from 33 studies, in the empirical analysis we use 
341 observations from 32 studies (see Table 1). Some observations are lost because (i) we are 
unable to match some estimates with data on capital controls, voter turnout and tax revenue 
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 Studies rarely report enough information from which these other effects can be calculated and included in a 
meta-analysis. Hence, by necessity, the MRA can only be conducted on the direct effect of expenditure 
competition between rival jurisdictions. 
 12 
decentralization (see section 4 below) and (ii) we removed 7 observations which were clear 
outliers.
11
  
The partial correlations for expenditure competition are illustrated in Figure 1, in the 
form of a funnel plot. The funnel plot illustrates the distribution of the partial correlations. 
Specifically, it traces the association between partial correlations and their associated 
precision, measured here as the inverse of the associated standard error (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2010; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). The funnel plot reveals two important 
pieces of information. First, it illustrates that the greater majority of estimated partial 
correlations are positive, indicating positive strategic interactions. There is, however, a fairly 
wide range of results reported in the literature. MRA can be used to explain this heterogeneity 
(see section 5 below). Second, it highlights the position of the central tendency of the results. 
The more precise estimates are closer together and tend to converge towards what might be 
considered to be the ‘real’ underlying effect. In our dataset, the weighted average of all 
partial correlation is +.07, suggesting a small positive degree of inter-jurisdiction expenditure 
interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Data comparability 
It is essential that the estimates included in the meta-dataset are comparable so that 
they can be included in the MRA. Our data consists of all estimates of public spending 
strategic interactions in published and unpublished studies. We are agnostic with regards to 
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 We used standardized residuals to identify outliers. Removing these outliers is also justified statistically on 
the grounds that it improves the MRA model diagnostics. 
 13 
the literature, and prefer not to eliminate studies based on whether they take certain 
approaches: instead we control for methodological differences via meta-regression. We 
confirmed data comparability by running three tests. First, we tested whether partial 
correlations differed significantly between published and unpublished studies. Second, we 
tested whether study results differ according to the quality of the journal in which they were 
reported. We used the 2009 Social Science Citation Index Journal Impact Factors as proxies 
for study quality, assigning a zero weight to unpublished studies and to any journal that is not 
indexed in the SSCI. Third, we regressed the precision of the estimated partial correlations 
against the same Impact Factors. The results of these tests are reported in Table 2, columns 1, 
2 and 3, respectively.
12
 We found no significant difference in partial correlations between 
published and unpublished studies (column 1) and no difference on the basis of the quality of 
the journal as measured by journal Impact Factors (columns 2 and 3). In contrast, we show 
below that the partial correlations do vary as a result of measurement, data, specification, and 
estimator differences.  
Our dataset purposefully includes estimates from different dimensions: estimates at 
different jurisdiction levels, in different countries, at different time periods, and for different 
types of expenditures. Expenditure on health, security, and infrastructure expenditures can be 
regarded as three different types of policy choices; internal redistributive, external threat, and 
internal developmental. Fiscal interactions might vary along these dimensions, e.g., 
redistributive spending may result in race-to-the-bottom while public spending on 
development might yield efficient competitive processes and positive effects. The benefit of 
pooling these estimates together is that it enables us to formally test whether there are 
significant differences between fiscal interactions along these dimensions. The key advantage 
of MRA is that it can deal with such heterogeneity. MRA enables the identification of 
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 For these estimates we include all observations except the outliers discussed above.  
 14 
multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. That is, instead of a priori assuming that strategic 
interactions differ along these dimensions, we statistically test whether they do differ.  
 
 
 
 
3.3 Publication selection bias  
Publication selection bias occurs when authors and/or journals have a preference for 
statistically significant results or a preference for results consistent with a certain theory 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). In such cases, authors 
do not report all of the results they uncover. Rather, they select results that are consistent with 
their priors, or results which they believe have a stronger chance of being published. The 
effect of this process is that certain findings are suppressed while others are over-represented. 
Consequently, inferences drawn from an empirical literature maybe biased.
13
 Typically, the 
bias is in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero effect. Hence, publication selection 
bias will tend to inflate the magnitude of an empirical effect.  
Stanley (2005, 2008) advocates a simple, though powerful, test for publication bias – 
the funnel asymmetry precision effect size test (FAT-PET). This involves regressing the 
partial correlations against a constant and the partial correlation’s standard error (SEij). The 
logic of this test is that estimates should not be correlated with their standard errors if a 
literature is free of publication selection bias (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley 2005, 2008). If 
researchers search for estimates that are statistically significant, then they will re-estimate 
their models until the relationship between r and SE achieves some acceptable standard of 
statistical significance (e.g. a t-statistic of 1.96). This process will generate a correlation 
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 This bias affects all reviews of the evidence base, be they systematic reviews of the evidence, qualitative 
literature reviews, or formal statistically based assessments like MRA. 
 15 
between the partial correlations with their standard errors (Stanley, 2008).
14
 The FAT-PET 
results are reported in Table 2, column 4. We find little evidence of a statistically significant 
association between the partial correlations and their standard errors: the coefficient on SE is 
weakly statistically significant (p-value = 0.078). Below we test for publication bias 
controlling for various other factors and find that SE is not statistically significant (see Table 
3). This is a rather heartening finding given evidence reported elsewhere that there is a large 
degree of selection bias in economics (see the papers in Roberts and Stanley, 2005). 
 
4. Regulation, political participation and decentralization 
Heterogeneity in reported estimates may arise from genuine empirical differences in 
the underlying government reaction functions (e.g. differences in the expenditure function, 
countries and time period analyzed), or it can arise from differences in the specification of 
Eq. (1) (e.g. differences in the weights used, control variables and estimator). We use the 
MRA model in Eq. (2) to quantify both the effects of misspecification and genuine 
differences in strategic interactions.  
One advantage of MRA is that it is able to explore associations that might not have 
been considered by the primary studies. We hypothesize that strategic interactions will be 
moderated by regulation, political participation, and the structure of federations.  
 
4.1 Capital mobility 
By impacting upon revenues, tax competition can drive and shape inter-jurisdictional 
expenditure spillovers. Tax driven strategic interactions require capital mobility: the more 
mobile capital is, the more likely that jurisdictions will engage in tax competition. For 
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 Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) argue that publication selection bias is analogous to sample selection biases 
and that it can be modeled as a Heckman-type regression: the MRA with a selection bias adjustment replaces the 
inverse Mills ratio term with the effect size’s standard error.  
 16 
federations such as the EU, we posit that easing capital controls increases capital mobility, 
stimulating tax competition which in turn generates expenditure interactions. If this is the 
case, the partial correlation of expenditure choices between rival jurisdictions will be 
positively related to the degree of regulation in capital controls.
15
 A similar process is 
postulated for jurisdictions within single country federations (e.g., the USA), particularly 
when jurisdictions have a balanced budget requirement. This results in a causal relationship 
between capital mobility and tax competition and ultimately expenditure competition.  
We explore this association by including the variable CapitalControl in the MRA. If 
CapitalControl has a positive coefficient in the MRA, then this is consistent with the notion 
that expenditure interactions are driven by tax competition. We use data from the Fraser 
Institute on International Capital Market Controls.
16
 This series is available only at the 
national level. Nevertheless, the national data should serve as a reasonably good proxy for 
capital controls at the sub-national government level, as capital controls are often imposed at 
the national level but their effect is felt throughout the economy and state and federal 
regulations often move together.
17
 
A positive relationship between the partial correlation of expenditure choices between 
rival jurisdictions and the degree of capital control regulations can also emerge when 
countries loosen capital controls and also devolve authority and financial resources to lower 
level jurisdictions. In this scenario, jurisdictions are given more to spend from the Federal 
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 Some authors have found that that capital mobility might have no effect on tax rates and that it might even 
increase them (Lockwood and Makris, 2006 and Lai 2010 and references therein). Our hypothesis is that capital 
controls will shape the magnitude of fiscal interactions. The resulting impact on the direction of tax rates – 
driving tax rates down or pushing them up – is an entirely different issue. 
16
 This is the series 4E, International Capital Market Controls. The maximum value of the series is 10, which 
denotes the most liberal regime, free of all international capital market controls. 
17
 For example, analysis of US sub-national labor market regulation data for the 1981 to 2010 period (Bueno, 
Ashby and McMahon, 2012) shows that labor market regulations are highly correlated in the majority of 
regions, with most correlations exceeding 0.70.   
 17 
government and they have greater choice in regulations and taxes they can impose, and 
public expenditures they can make. Consequently, in our MRA we control for the degree of 
tax revenue decentralization and we also control for whether the primary estimates controlled 
for grants received from the Federal government.   
 
4.2 Political participation 
Our second constructed variable relates to political participation.
18
 According to 
yardstick competition theory, voters make inter-jurisdictional comparisons as an attempt to 
overcome agency problems (Besley and Case, 1995; Wilson and Gordon, 2003). If this 
process holds, then there should be a positive correlation between inter-jurisdiction 
interactions and the degree of political competition. As a measure of this process, we 
considered the Polity series on political competition (Polity2). However, this series displayed 
no variation for the countries included in our dataset. Instead, we use data on voter turnout, 
VoterTurnout. This is the total number of votes cast (both valid and invalid) divided by the 
number of names on the voters' register. We constructed this series using data from the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and from various national and 
sub-national electoral bodies. We matched as closely as possible the level at which 
expenditure competition is occurring with voter turnout. Thus, for competition between 
nations we used voter turnout in national elections, while for competition at the municipality 
level we used voter turnout at municipal elections. We were able to do this for 86% of the 
observations. Where it was not possible to match the level of disaggregation we used the next 
level of voter turnout, e.g., we use turnout at the state level as a proxy for municipal elections 
and national elections as a proxy for state level turnout. 
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 Political participation is a different phenomenon to political competition. We would prefer to have data on 
political competition, such as the electoral margin of the top two candidates in each set of elections, but this 
information is unavailable for many of the samples used in our meta-study. 
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The median voter might very well be different at low levels of voter turnout than at 
higher levels. Arguably, the median voter at low levels of voter turnout will have a higher 
socio-economic background and is more likely to be industry friendly. In contrast, the median 
voter at higher levels of voter turnout might have a lower socio-economic background, with a 
stronger preference to increase public expenditure and potentially be less industry friendly. If 
this is the case, then all else equal, voter turnout will be positively correlated with 
expenditure competition: there will then be a positive correlation between voter turnout and 
the partial correlation between the expenditure choices of rival jurisdictions. 
 
4.3 Fiscal decentralization 
A third variable is Fiscal decentralization. Fiscal interactions are driven by decision 
makers with autonomy over benefits and/or taxes. Hence, we expect that fiscal interactions 
will be shaped by the degree of decentralization. However, it is unclear whether fiscal 
decentralization has a positive or negative effect on the partial correlation of expenditure 
choices between rival jurisdictions. Some authors such as Keen and Marchand (1997) predict 
that fiscal interactions will result in excessive public spending in productive investments and 
insufficient spending on public consumption goods. Others, however, argue that there are 
factors operating that will lead to insufficient investment. The net effect on public spending 
on investment is thus unclear, as is the net effect on total investment. Tax decentralization is 
an important driver behind these spending biases.
19
 In order to explore this effect we use the 
series on tax revenue decentralization constructed by Stegarescu (2005).
20
 A positive 
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 Kappeler, Solé-Ollé, Stephan and Vӓlilӓ (2013) point out that sub-national jurisdictions are responsible for 
most public infrastructure. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) and Kappeler, Solé-Ollé, Stephan and Vӓlilӓ (2013) find 
that decentralization increases spending on infrastructure and public goods but not on redistributive outlays. 
20
 Higher values indicate a greater degree of decentralization. Other series are available, such as IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics and the Fiscal Empowerment series by Boex and Simatupang (2008). However, 
these data series tend to overstate the degree of decentralization (Stegarescu, 2005).  
 19 
(negative) coefficient in the MRA indicates that fiscal decentralization increases (decreases) 
fiscal interactions.  
Descriptive statistics for these three variables are reported in Table 1, columns 2, 3, 
and 4. Capital controls, voter turnout and federal structure vary over time and between 
countries. We take advantage of this variation to explore the effects of regulation, political 
participation and federal structure on strategic interactions. As noted above, while various 
predictions are possible, our own expectations are that tax competition should increase as 
capital controls ease, while yardstick competition should increase as voter turnout rises. If the 
effects of capital controls on strategic interactions are greater (lower) than the effects of voter 
turnout, then we can conclude that tax competition (yardstick competition) is more 
prominent.  
 
5. MRA Results 
Various versions of the MRA model, Eq.(2), were estimated and the key results are 
presented in Table 3. We restricted the MRA to 27 variables that capture the main differences 
in the data, specification and estimation of Eq. (1).
21
 Column 1 lists the moderator variables 
and their means and standard deviations. The first of these is Standard error which is 
included to test and correct for publication selection bias (Stanley, 2008). This offers a 
multiple regression version of the FAT-PET reported in Table 2, Column 4. Next we include 
the three variables (discussed in section 4 above) constructed using data collected from 
sources external to the primary studies; CapitalControl, VoterTurnout, and FiscalDecentral 
(capital market controls, voter turnout, and the degree of federalism, respectively). 
Seven variables are included to capture data differences. Differences in the 
measurement of the dependent variable are reflected in three binary variables, Health, 
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 As part of robustness checks, we also expanded the MRA model to include other variables in the MRA, but 
these were not statistically significant in explaining observed heterogeneity; see Table 5 below.  
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Security, and Infrastructure, which take the value of 1 if the measure of competition is based 
on spending on health, security, or infrastructure, respectively. The base for this model is 
total expenditure and all other types of expenditure. State and Nation are binary variables that 
allow us to test how the level of government affects the magnitude of expenditure 
competition, with municipality as the base. Panel is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
panel data are used, with cross-sectional data as the base.
22
 AverageYear is the average year 
of the sample used. This variable is included to test whether the degree of expenditure 
competition varies over time. This variable is normalized at the mean of the sample, 1991. A 
negative (positive) sign on this variable would indicate that fiscal spending interactions are 
becoming weaker (stronger) over time. It is also possible that this variable might be picking 
up improvements in the quality of estimates over time or better quality data over time. Note 
that capital controls have loosened in the EU over time. Given the discussion above this 
should then result in time trend in data (at least for estimates relating to this region). 
However, we condition the MRA for changes in capital controls. Hence, the AverageYear 
variable is picking up factors unrelated to capital controls. 
Five variables relate to estimation differences. Time effects is a binary variable for 
those studies that use panel data and control for fixed time period effects.
23
 The existence of 
strategic interactions means that expenditure policies are endogenous and determined jointly 
by competing policy makers. The variables IV and ML are binary variables that capture any 
difference in estimates that address this endogeneity by instrumenting spending competition 
and the use of maximum likelihood estimation, respectively. OtherNonOLS is a binary 
variable for studies that use other estimators. Most studies use contiguity or distance to assign 
weights to rival jurisdictions: the further away a jurisdiction is, the less weight it is assigned. 
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 Essentially these variables capture some of the differences between partial and general equilibrium effects. 
23
 In unreported regressions we also considered fixed jurisdiction effects. This variable was never statistically 
significant in the MRA.  
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NoWeight is a binary variable taking the value of 1 for studies that take a simple average of 
other regions.  
The variables Sweden, UK and AllOthers capture any national differences, with the 
USA as the base. Since the MRA also includes CapitalControl, VoterTurnout and 
FiscalDecentral, the three country dummies are picking up any remaining unobservable 
differences between countries that might affect estimates of government expenditure strategic 
interactions.  
Model specification differences are reflected in the seven binary variables that capture 
the effect of including specific controls in the primary studies. Grants, Income, Population, 
Unemployment, Politics, Neighborlag, and Neighborchar are all binary variables that control 
whether the primary study includes grants, income, population, unemployment, the politics of 
the ruling party as control variables, the use of a lagged measure of the neighbor’s benefit 
instead of a contemporaneous value,
24
and the characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions, 
rather than just controlling of the characteristics of the own jurisdiction, respectively.  
Column 2 presents estimates of the general MRA with all 27 variables when OLS is 
used, with standard errors adjusted for the clustering of observations within studies. These 27 
variables quantify the main differences between studies in the measures, data, specification, 
and estimation. Column 3 presents the same model estimated using WLS, using ‘optimal 
weights’, i.e., each estimate is weighted by its inverse variance. This assigns greater weight to 
estimates that are reported with greater precision. Column 4 presents the results attained 
through a general-to-specific modeling strategy, sequentially removing any variable that was 
not statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The reason for estimating this model is 
that MRA variables are often highly collinear and the general-to-specific model reveals the 
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 This is often adopted to get around the endogeneity between the own and neighboring jurisdiction’s 
expenditures. 
 22 
underlying associations with greater clarity (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
25
 Most of 
the observations included in our dataset relate to sub-national fiscal interactions, while 9% 
relate to national fiscal interactions. In column 5 we present the results of just sub-national 
fiscal interactions. Columns 2 to 5 use a WLS fixed effects MRA. This is also known as 
unrestricted WLS (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2013, 2015). In contrast, column 6 reports the 
results from a random effects MRA. Our preferred estimates are presented in columns 3 and 
4. The OLS and random effects results are presented for the sake of robustness. The main 
problem with OLS is that it ignores the heteroscedasticity in meta-analysis data. The 
precision of estimates of strategic interactions varies across studies and this needs to be 
accommodated via weighted least squares. Column 6 uses WLS but with random effects 
weights. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) caution against the use of this estimator in the case 
of observational data as the random effects may not be independent of the underlying 
heterogeneity in the meta-data, resulting in biased estimates. Monte Carlo simulations 
indicate that unrestricted WLS is preferable to random effects (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 
2013, 2015).  
The MRA models reported in Table 3 explain over 40% of the variation in partial 
correlations. This is actually a fairly large proportion of the variation, given that it highly 
likely that there will be much random variation in estimates of strategic interactions. As 
already noted, the preferred models are reported in columns 3 and 4. Both of these models 
pass various diagnostic tests.
26
 The constant in these MRA models measures the degree of 
expenditure competition (as measured by partial correlations) for studies using US data on 
total expenditures at the municipality level, using cross-sectional data for 1991, estimated by 
OLS, without any of the controls listed in the table, using distance to weigh neighbors’ 
spending and setting the three institutional data variables to zero. The MRA variables are 
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 A Wald test was conducted to confirm that the omitted variables were redundant: p-value is 0.15. 
26
 For example, the MRA model reported in Column 4 passes the RESET test (p-value = 0.60) and the linktest 
(p-value = 0.27). 
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then interpreted relative to this constant. A statistically significant negative (positive) 
coefficient in the MRA indicates that the variable reduces (increases) the size of the fiscal 
interaction.  
Several robust results emerge from Table 3. First, Standard error is not statistically 
significant when unrestricted WLS is used. This is broadly in line with the findings from 
Table 2 (column 4) where there was only weak statistical evidence of publication selection in 
this literature. There is evidence of publication bias when OLS and the random effects 
estimator is used, but as noted above we do not put much credence to the results from these 
models.
27
 
Second, we find that relaxing capital controls (higher values of CapitalControl) 
increases interdependence between jurisdictions. This finding can be explained by the flow 
on effect of tax competition on expenditure competition. Competing for mobile capital 
through the relaxation of capital controls effectively results in linking expenditure decisions 
between jurisdictions. Keeping the tax base and federal grants constant, a change in the tax 
rate alters revenues and hence expenditure. This flows on to the expenditure decisions of rival 
jurisdictions.  
Decentralization (higher values of FiscalDecentral), on the other hand, has the opposite 
effect of relaxing capital controls: decentralization reduces welfare and spending competition. 
This means that when jurisdictions have greater tax revenue autonomy they are less likely to 
engage in strategic spending interactions with rival jurisdictions. In other words, the less 
autonomy they have in raising their own revenue, the more likely they are to use spending as 
a policy instrument. Hence, a negative coefficient in the MRA is consistent with the view that 
fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in increased tax competition than it is in 
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 We also interacted SE with the journal Impact Factors. Adding this variable to the general-to-specific model 
(Column 4 of Table 3) produces a positive coefficient, 0.47, suggesting that higher ranked journals tend to 
report estimates that are more likely to arise from publication selection biased. However, this interaction 
variable is not statistically significant (t-statistic = 1.67, p-value = 0.105). 
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expenditure yardstick competition.  When taken together, the results from CapitalControl and 
FiscalDecentral suggest that the effects of relaxing capital controls are weaker when fiscal 
decentralization is greater.  
Voter turnout appears to have no effect on expenditure competition.
28
 We interpret this 
to mean that political participation does not moderate strategic spending interactions. This 
suggests that yardstick competition effects may affect the magnitude of public spending 
interactions, at least in the countries covered by our data. Hence, we conclude from the MRA 
results that expenditure interactions appear to be driven by tax competition rather than 
yardstick competition.  
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 One possible explanation for this is the ability of jurisdictions to manipulate who is actually eligible to vote. 
This can also arise when jurisdictions are very heterogeneous with respect to the median voter. 
 25 
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A third finding is that data make a significant difference. The negative coefficient on 
Security indicates that inter-jurisdictional expenditure competition is smaller with respect to 
security. This is consistent with the notion that jurisdictions might free ride on spending 
decisions made by others. The level of the jurisdiction is also important. The State and Nation 
variables both have negative coefficients in the MRA. The use of state or nation level data 
results in smaller expenditure competition effects, compared to the base (municipality data). 
That is, strategic interactions appear to be weaker amongst rival states and nations than they 
are at lower level jurisdictions. Panel has a positive coefficient indicating that studies that use 
panel data report stronger strategic interactions than studies that use cross-sectional data. 
AverageYear has a negative coefficient indicating that expenditure competition is time 
variant and has been declining over time. The country dummy variables are not statistically 
significant in the preferred WLS models. This means that there are no country differences in 
fiscal interactions conditional on capital controls and fiscal decentralization differences.  
Our fourth finding is that, surprisingly, the estimation variables are not important in 
explaining the variation in the reported results. The one possible exception is that the 
inclusion of time fixed effects results in smaller strategic interactions. The use of an IV or a 
maximum likelihood estimator does not appear to make a noticeable difference to reported 
results once other differences in data and research designed are controlled for. Not using any 
weights at all (treating all jurisdictions equally) also makes no difference to the reported 
estimates of expenditure competition, once other dimensions of research design are taken into 
account. 
Fifth, econometric specification also matters. The inclusion of grants, the politics of the 
party in office, and population in an econometric model all result in larger expenditure 
interactions. In contrast, unemployment, the neighbor’s spending levels lagged and 
characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions, all result in smaller effects.  
 27 
The MRA coefficients can be used to estimate the degree of expenditure interactions 
arising from inter-jurisdictional competition. We report such estimates in Table 4, for the US 
and for all countries combined, for total spending and spending on security, and at the 
municipal and state jurisdiction levels. In forming such estimates we use country specific data 
on capital controls and fiscal decentralization. We assume that the inter-jurisdiction 
competition occurs at either the municipality or the county level and that a well-constructed 
model will include controls for grants, the politics of the party, population, and 
unemployment.
29
 The average of all countries combined (Column 2 of the first row of Table 
4) shows a positive partial correlation between rival jurisdictions spending. This suggests the 
existence of a negative spending externality. A positive partial correlation means that the ith 
jurisdiction will reduce its spending when other jurisdictions decrease theirs. That is, the rival 
jurisdictions decisions have an adverse effect on the ith jurisdiction. However, it also means 
that when other jurisdictions increase their spending, it becomes easier for the ith jurisdiction 
to increase spending. The point estimates of interactions for the USA (the second row of 
Table 4) are slightly lower than for all countries combined. However, the 95% confidence 
intervals overlap significantly so that there is no practical difference in the size of the 
interactions. Table 4 also confirms that interactions at the municipal/county level are 
significantly larger than those at the state/provincial level, with little overlap in the 
confidence intervals. In all cases, there is no evidence of fiscal interactions with regarding to 
spending on security: the point estimates vary from positive to negative but the confidence 
intervals always include zero. 
Cohen (1988) provides well-known guidelines for the practical significance of a 
correlation: 0.1 for a small effect, 0.3 is medium, and anything larger than 0.5 is a large 
effect. Doucouliagos (2011) provides similar guidelines for the practical significance of a 
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 We also assume that panel data are used and that model is estimated using either IV, or maximum likelihood 
or OLS with a lag value in the rival jurisdictions spending, with time effects included.  
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partial correlation: 0.07 is a small effect, 0.17 is a moderate effect and 0.33 is a large effect. 
Hence, we can conclude that fiscal spending interactions at the municipality jurisdiction level 
are moderate in size and of some practical importance.  
 
  
Robustness 
Table 5 reports the results of various robustness checks on the general-to-specific MRA 
model reported in Column 4 of Table 3, which is reproduced in row 1 for comparison. Note, 
however, that we add back in VoterTurnout to this specific model. Table 5 reports the 
coefficients on the CapitalControl, VoterTurnout, and FiscalDecentral variables. First, 
instead of adjusting standard errors for data clustering, we re-estimated the MRA model using 
a multilevel mixed effects model estimated using REML. The key difference is that voter 
turnout now emerges with a statistically significant negative coefficient, suggesting that 
greater political participation reduces strategic interactions between jurisdictions. Row 3 
reports the results of re-estimating the MRA without adjusting standard errors for data 
clustering. Row 4 reports the results using Robust regression, which is less sensitive to the 
effects of outliers (recall however that we have already removed several outliers from the 
data). The MRA was also re-estimated with the addition of more control variables (see the 
notes to Table 5). These results are reported in row 5. Finally, row 6 reports the results of 
adding study fixed effects to the MRA. This model focuses on the within study differences in 
reported results and is not comparable to the other models. With the exception of row 6, the 
results are robust to these alternative approaches.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The design of federal and decentralized jurisdictions is said to improve government 
efficiency when jurisdictions interact. Interactions can arise from tax competition to attract 
tax revenues, and through political competition to maximize political support, by setting 
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public expenditure to the preferences of voters among competing constituencies. This paper 
applies meta-regression analysis to investigate the magnitude of strategic expenditure 
interactions between jurisdictions, namely the extent to which expenditure in one jurisdiction 
is influenced by rival jurisdictions’ actions. MRA is particularly helpful in revealing the 
causes of inter-jurisdictional interactions when the extant evidence is diverse and conflicting 
because of study specific heterogeneity and institutional differences. We draw several robust 
conclusions from the analysis. 
The evidence points strongly to the existence of inter-jurisdictional expenditure 
interdependence among lower level jurisdictions (municipalities and counties). However, 
compared to the municipality level, horizontal expenditure competition is weaker when the 
jurisdiction is a State. That is, the strategic spending interactions are more pronounced at the 
municipal and county levels, and less so at the State level. However, there is some 
heterogeneity in our results, as we find an absence of interactions with respect to spending on 
security.  More importantly for the design of institutions, we find that expenditure 
interactions are becoming weaker over time. This might be driven by rising political costs of 
inter-jurisdictional rivalry, as per Basinger and Hallerberg (2004). This finding is also 
consistent with expressive voting (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993). Specifically, if voting 
behavior is becoming increasingly driven by expressive considerations, then over time this 
will weaken the correlation between the spending decisions of rival jurisdictions. 
Alternatively, this could reflect higher quality and more accurate estimates arising from the 
availability of better datasets over time. However, our reading of the literature is that the 
quality of data used has not materially changed over time.
30
 We also find that much of the 
observed variation in strategic interactions can be explained by differences in the 
specification of the fiscal interactions econometrics model. 
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 Another possibility is that the declining effect might be a statistical artefact caused by the early literature 
publishing exaggerated results, with the subsequent studies ‘correcting’ the evidence base. 
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Analysis of the effects of regulation, political participation and decentralization 
indicates that capital controls and fiscal decentralization play an instrumental role in shaping 
expenditure interactions. Relaxing capital controls strengthens strategic expenditure 
interactions whereas granting jurisdictions greater tax revenue autonomy decreases strategic 
interactions. Capital controls, however, appear to be more important. Evaluated at sample 
means, we find that the elasticity of strategic interactions with respect to capital controls is 
3.97, while the elasticity of strategic interactions with respect to decentralization is -1.36. 
Hence, a one percentage reduction in capital controls has nearly three times the effect on 
strategic interactions as does an equivalent percentage change in decentralization. This is 
consistent with the view that expenditure interactions are indeed induced by tax competition 
between rival jurisdictions. While some of the robustness results suggest otherwise (recall 
Table 5), our main results (Table 3) indicate that political participation is not an important 
factor. This suggests that yardstick competition driven by political incentives alone is 
insufficient to drive expenditure interactions, at least in the countries and time periods 
included in our study and when yardstick competition is proxied by voter turnout. This is an 
important finding suggesting that regional political interactions are not as important to the 
magnitude of strategic interactions and race to the bottom trends as some studies have 
suggested. Potential explanations include the imperfect nature of the electoral mechanisms in 
place to reward and penalize incumbents that overspend and the limited transparency of 
political markets for the median voter to be able to fully judge the relative efficiency of one 
government to another.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Funnel Plot for Estimates of Horizontal Inter-Jurisdiction Expenditure 
Interactions  
 
 
 
Notes: The solid line denotes the position of weighted average partial correlation (+.07). The dash line 
denotes the position of a zero partial correlation. The vertical axis measures precision calculated as the 
inverse of the standard error of the partial correlation. 
 
Table 1: Country Composition of Estimates of Inter-Jurisdictional Expenditure 
Interactions  
Country  Number of studies 
[estimates] 
(1) 
Tax revenue 
decentralization 
(2) 
Capital  
controls 
(3) 
Voter  
turnout 
(4) 
USA  15 [156] 38.10 (6.75) 8.12 (0.75) 54.04 (8.19) 
Sweden  6 [68] 44.07 (1.05) 7.91 (1.71) 81.58 (3.26) 
UK  5 [30] 6.33 (3.06) 9.17 (0.45) 44.37 (3.35) 
Switzerland  2 [21] 55.67 (0.56) 9.53 (0.14) 44.70 (0.84) 
All studies 341 [32] 32.08 (15.02) 7.92 (1.22) 62.38 (14.87) 
Note: Cells in columns 2 to 4 report averages with standard deviations in brackets. Section 4 discusses these 
variables. 
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Table 2: Meta-data Comparability and Publication Selection Bias Tests 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
FAT-PET 
(4) 
Constant .058  
(2.39) 
.056  
(2.72) 
29.339  
(6.24) 
.026 
 (1.09) 
     
Published .011 
 (0.37) 
- - - 
     
Impact factor - .009  
(0.65) 
-3.164 
 (-1.46) 
- 
 
     
Standard  
error 
- - - 1.245  
(1.82) 
     
Adjusted R
2
 .001 .005 .063 .042 
 
Notes: The number of observations is 355 estimates from 33 studies. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2 
and 4 is the partial correlation. The dependent variable in column 3 is the precision of the partial correlation. 
Columns 1, 2 and 4 are estimated using unrestricted WLS, with inverse variance weights. Column 3 is estimated 
using OLS. Brackets report t-statistics using standard errors corrected for the clustering of observations within 
studies. Column 4 reports results of the FAT-PET model. Published is a binary variable with a value of 1 for 
studies that are published and 0 otherwise. Impact factor is the SSCI journal Impact Factor. 
 
Table 3: Meta-Regression Analysis of Inter-Jurisdictional Expenditure Competition 
(Dependent variable is partial correlations)  
 
Variable Mean 
(S.D.) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Unrestricted 
WLS 
(3) 
General to 
Specific 
WLS 
(4) 
Without nation 
estimates 
WLS 
(5) 
Random 
effects 
WLS  
(6) 
Constant  -.23 (1.22) -.29 (1.61) -.21 (1.94) -.21 (1.92) -.28 (1.50) 
Standard error .05 (.03) 1.41 (1.81) 1.35 (1.41) - - 1.60 (3.23) 
Regulation, political participation and decentralization 
CapitalControl 7.98 (1.15) .08 (4.28)  .06 (2.34) .04 (5.00) .04 (4.95) .07 (6.46) 
VoterTurnout 62.30(14.50) -.01 (0.78) .01 (0.57) - - -.01 (0.22) 
FiscalDecentral 30.80(15.75) -.01 (2.07) -.01 (1.47) -.01 (3.68) -.01 (3.70) -.01 (3.29) 
Data differences 
Health  .09 (.28) -.01 (0.35) .02 (1.34) - - -.01 (0.03) 
Security .06 (.25) -.20 (4.34) -.16 (4.48) -.16 (3.94) -.16 (3.70) -.19 (6.40) 
Infrastructure .08 (.27) -.01 (0.30) .01 (0.42) - - .01 (0.03) 
State  .40 (.49) -.14 (2.90) -.15 (2.80) -.10 (3.49) -.10 (3.41) -.15 (4.23) 
Nation .09 (.29) -.25 (1.87) -.40 (3.08) -.19 (3.68) - -.30 (3.08) 
Panel  .75 (.43) .17 (1.90) .14 (1.54) .14 (2.05) .14 (2.06) .16 (5.16) 
AverageYear 2.67 (6.94) -.01 (1.36) -.01 (2.01) -.01 (2.78) -.01 (2.71) -.01 (2.31) 
Estimator differences 
Time effects .56 (.50) -.07 (1.56) -.06 (2.59) -.06 (1.65) -.06 (1.66) -.06 (2.54) 
IV .38 (.49) .01 (0.54) -.03 (1.85) - - .01 (0.23) 
ML .26 (.44) .02 (0.48) -.02 (0.55) - - .01 (0.25) 
OtherNonOLS .07 (.26) -.03 (1.09) -.05 (1.79) - - -.03 (1.05) 
NoWeight .10 (.30) -.04 (1.27) -.04 (1.21) - - -.02 (0.86) 
Country differences 
Sweden .18 (.38) -.05 (0.41) -.13 (0.90) - - -.09 (0.84) 
UK .08 (.28) -.35 (2.07) -.21 (0.89) - - -.31 (2.87) 
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AllOthers .17 (.38) -.21 (1.43) -.18 (1.10) - - -.21 (2.20) 
Specification differences 
Grants .59 (.49) .13 (3.63) .06 (1.69) .07 (3.09) .07 (3.06) .12 (4.58) 
Income .68 (.47) -.04 (0.91) -.05 (1.18) - - -.05 (1.77) 
Neighborlag .12 (.32) -.01 (0.25) -.03 (2.17) -.02 (1.79) -.02 (1.82) -.01 (0.59) 
Neighborchar .15 (.36) -.05 (1.86) -.04 (1.65) -.05 (1.95) -.05 (1.95) -.04 (1.69) 
Politics .49 (.50) .15 (5.15) .13 (3.88) .09 (5.80) .10 (5.54) .15 (7.55) 
Population .79 (.41) .05 (1.32) .07 (2.65) .06 (1.96) .06 (1.97) .05 (1.91) 
Unemployment .54 (.50) -.10 (2.61) -.11 (3.02) -.09 (3.65) -.09 (3.66) -.10 (4.51) 
F-test 
 327.32 
[0.00] 
529.04 
[0.00] 
38.59 
[0.00] 
39.66 
[0.00] 
11.30 
[0.00] 
Adjusted R
2
  .47 .42 .42 .43 .52 
 
Notes: The number of observations is 341 estimates from 32 studies for columns 2 to 4 and 6, and 309 estimates 
from 30 studies in column 5. Cell entries in bold denote statistical significance at least at the 10% level. Cell 
entries in brackets in columns 2 to 5 report absolute values of t-statistics derived using standard errors adjusted 
for data clustering. Column 2 uses OLS, while columns 3 to 5 use unrestricted weighted least squares using 
inverse variance weights. Column 6 reports results of a random effects MRA estimated using Restricted 
Maximum Likelihood.  
 
Table 4:  Summary of MRA Estimates of Spatial Interactions,  
USA and All Countries combined 
 
 Municipality/County 
jurisdiction 
State jurisdiction 
 Security 
spending 
Other 
spending 
Security 
spending 
Other 
spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
All Countries .04 
(-.07 to .14) 
.20  
(.13 to .27) 
-.06 
(-.17 to .04) 
.09 
(.03 to .16) 
     
USA .02 
(-.09 to .12) 
.17  
(.10 to .25) 
-.09 
(-.19 to .02) 
.07 
(.01 to .14) 
     
Note: MRA predictions using unrestricted WLS regression coefficients reported in column 4 of Table 
3. 95% confidence intervals reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness of MRA   
 
 Capital controls Voter turnout Decentralization 
Main results (1) .04 (5.00) -.01 (-0.27) -.01 (-3.68) 
Multilevel (2) .05 (5.94) -.01 (-2.07) -.01 (-2.72) 
Without clustering (3) .04 (6.08) -.01 (-0.39) -.01 (-5.73) 
Robust regression (4) .05 (5.42) -.01 (-1.23) -.01 (-3.12) 
With additional controls (5) .04 (3.17) -.01 (-0.55) -.01 (-1.75) 
Fixed effects (6) .05 (1.08) .01 (0.14) -.03 (-4.19) 
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Notes: The first row reports the results of the model reported in Table 3, Column 4, with the addition of the 
VoterTurnout variable. The second row uses a multilevel mixed effects model estimated using restricted 
maximum likelihood. The third row uses WLS but does not adjust standard errors for data clustering. The 
fourth   row uses Robust regression. The fifth row adds additional controls variables: welfare spending, 
education spending, a dummy for jurisdiction fixed effects, GMM estimator, non-contiguity weights, 
Switzerland, and vertical expenditure competition. The sixth row adds study fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
